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OPINION OF THE COURT  
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Before us is an appeal by plaintiffs, including eleven parents of children 
who attend public schools in Philadelphia 
suing on their own behalf and that of their children (hereafter "school 
children"), from the order of the United States  
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissing their 
complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure  
12. The complaint challenges the practices of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania in funding public education as having  
a racially discriminatory effect. This appeal requires us to consider 
whether a private plaintiff may state a claim under a  
regulation implementing Title VI, whether the complaint adequately states 
a claim under that regulation, and whether a  
claim may be maintained under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of that 
regulation.  
 
I.  
 
On March 9, 1998, a diverse group of plaintiffsfiled suit against several 
Pennsylvania officials, alleging in Count I the  
violation of the regulation the Department of Education (DOE) adopted to 
implement Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of  
1964, and in Count II a violation of 42 U.S.C.§ 1983. The parents of 
several Philadelphia public school children were joined  
as plaintiffs by the following six organizations that devote substantial 
resources to overcoming what they allege are the  
disparate and inadequate educational programs caused by the challenged 
practices: (1) The Black Clergy of Philadelphia  
and Vicinity; (2) Philadelphia Branch NAACP; (3) ASPIRA, Inc. of 
Pennsylvania; (4) Parents Union of Public Schools; (5)  
Citizens Committee on Public Education in Philadelphia; and (6) Parents 
United for Better Schools. Also joining as plaintiffs  
were several local officials and entities: (1) the School District of 
Philadelphia; (2) its superintendent, David W. Hornbeck; (3)  
its Board of Education; (4) the Board's president, Floyd W. Alston; (5) 
the City of Philadelphia; and (6) the City's mayor,  
Edward G. Rendell. These original plaintiffs were later joined without 
objection by intervenors the Philadelphia Federation of  
Teachers Local 3 AFT AFL-CIO, and Ted Kirsch as Guardian ad Litem.  
 
The complaint names as defendants four state employees in their "official 
and individual capacities": Thomas J. 
Ridge, Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Dr. James P. 
Gallagher, Chairperson of the Board of 
Education of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Dr. Eugene W. Hickok, 
Secretary of Education; and Barbara 
Hafer, Treasurer, (the "executive defendants"). Four Commonwealth 
legislative leaders, Representative Matthew J. 
Ryan, Senator Robert C. Jubelirer, Representative Jess M. Stairs, and 
Senator James J. Rhoades, joined as 
intervenor defendants ("legislative defendants").  
 
All of the plaintiffs seek two forms of relief: (1) "a declaration that 
the defendants `through their funding policies and  
practices, discriminate against African- American, Hispanic, Asian and 
other minority students in the School District and the  
City' " in violation of the administrative regulation promulgated under 
Title VI and (2) "an injunction prohibiting defendants  
prospectively `from continuing to implement a system of funding public 
schools that discriminates against . . . minority children  
enrolled in' the School District `and that thereby harms' all plaintiffs." 
Appellants' Br. at 16. The school children and organizations  
also seek "a declaration that [the] funding policies and practices deprive 
them of the rights, privileges and immunities secured by 
 the laws of the United States, in violation of § 1983." Appellants' Br. 
at 16.  
 
On May 4, 1998, the original defendants filed a motion to dismiss the 
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). In June, the United States 
filed a brief amicus curiae in support of the plaintiffs. On July 6, 1998, 
the intervening defendants also filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion  
to dismiss. The United States then filed a second brief amicus curiae.  
 
The original defendants and the intervening defendants each filed a second 
motion to dismiss after the Supreme 
Court dismissed its grant of certiorari in Chester Residents Concerned for 
Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d 
Cir. 1997), vacated as moot, 119 S. Ct. 22 (1998). Certiorari had been 
sought on this court's holding in Chester 
Residents that an implied private right of action exists under the 
regulations promulgated under Title VI. In response to  
the four motions to dismiss, plaintiffs requested oral argument and/or a 
status conference, and the United States notified  
the District Court that it intended to file an additional amicus brief 
addressing the Chester Residents decision. The District  
Court, however, dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim 
without holding the requested status conference, hearing  
oral argument, or waiting to receive the government's third amicus brief.  
 
Our review of a district court's dismissal of a complaint is plenary. See 
Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1993). We  
apply the same test the district court should have used initially. See 
Holder v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 193 (3d  
Cir. 1993). We will not uphold a dismissal for failure to state a claim 
if, "under any reasonable reading of the pleadings,  
plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Id. at 194. In reviewing the 
plaintiff's complaint, "[w]e are required to `accept as true  
the facts alleged . . . and all inferences that can be drawn therefrom.' " 
D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational  
Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1367 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (quoting 
Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100,  
103 (3d Cir. 1990)).  
 
II.  
 
Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides:  
 
No person in the United States shall, on the grounds of race, color, or 
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be  
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.  
42 U.S.C. § 2000d.  
 
The Supreme Court has held that section 601 of Title VI prohibiting 
exclusion or discrimination from federal programs  
on account of race, color or national origin prohibits only intentional 
discrimination. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil  
Service Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983).  
 However, another provision of Title VI, section 602, "authorize[s] and 
direct[s]" federal departments and agencies 
that extend federal financial assistance to particular programs or 
activities "to effectuate the provisions of section 
2000d [section 601] . . . by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of 
general applicability." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1. At 
least 40 federal agencies have adopted regulations that prohibit 
disparate-impact discrimination pursuant to this 
authority. See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 619 (Marshall, J. dissenting).  
 
The Department of Education, in exercising its statutory authority under 
section 602, promulgated such a regulation,  
codified as 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2), which prohibits a funding recipient 
from "utiliz[ing] criteria or methods of  
administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to 
discrimination because of their race, color, or national  
origin, or have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing 
accomplishment of the program as respects individuals 
of a particular race, color, or national origin." Id. Count I of the 
complaint before us is based on this regulation  
prohibiting discriminatory effects in educational programs.  
 
A.  
 
The District Court held that the complaint fails to state a claim under 
Title VI1 or the Department of Education's 
_________________________________________________________________  
 
1. The District Court read the complaint as alleging a violation of Title 
VI. At oral argument, the plaintiffs' counsel  
acknowledged that the complaint does not have a separate count under the 
statute, although it does allege that  
defendants adopted their different funding methodologies with knowledge of 
the racially discriminatory 
consequences. Counsel noted that in a recent decision, Davis v. Monroe 
County Board of Education, 119 S. Ct. 
1661 (1999), the Supreme Court held that in some circumstances a school 
district's deliberate indifference to  
sexual harassment of which it had knowledge amounts to an intentional 
violation of Title IX. Counsel here  
argued that there is a spectrum between the extremes of intentional 
discrimination and Title VI  
 
 
regulations because it does not adequately allege that a specific element 
of the Commonwealth's funding practices  
adversely and disproportionately affects students of a particular race. 
Powell v. Ridge, No. 98-1223, slip op. at 32  
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 1998). Plaintiffs challenge this holding on appeal, 
insisting that their complaint meets the  
applicable pleading standard.  
 
Although the Supreme Court has not yet spoken on the issue, the courts of 
appeals have generally agreed that the 
parties' respective burdens in a Title VI disparate impact case should 
follow those developed in Title VII cases.  
See, e.g., New York Urban League, Inc. v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d 
Cir. 1995); City of Chicago v. Lindley, 
 66 F.3d 819, 828-29 & n.12 (7th Cir. 1995); Elston v. Talladega County 
Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407  
(11th Cir. 1993); cf. NAACP v. Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1333 (3d 
Cir. 1981) (en banc) (accepting without  
comment parties' suggestion that "the decisional law allocating the burden 
of production and persuasion under  
Title VII is instructive in [a Title VI] case"). Thus, a plaintiff in a 
Title VI disparate impact suit bears the initial burden  
of establishing a prima facie case that a facially neutral practice has 
resulted in a racial disparity. See Ferguson v.  
City of Charleston, ___ F.3d ___, 1999 WL 492681 (4th Cir. July 13, 1999); 
New York Urban League, 71 F.3d at 1036;  
Elston, 997 F.2d at 1407. If the plaintiff meets that burden, then the 
defendant must establish a "substantial legitimate  
justification," see New York Urban League, 71 F.3d at 1036, or a 
"legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason[]," Medical Ctr.  
Inc., 657 F.2d at 1331, for the practice. See Georgia State Conference of 
Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403,  
1417 (11th Cir. 1985). Once the defendant meets its rebuttal burden, the 
plaintiff must then establish either that the  
defendant overlooked an equally effective alternative with less 
discriminatory effects or that the proffered justification  
is no more than a pretext for racial discrimination. See Georgia State 
Conference, 775 F.2d at 1417.  
 
_________________________________________________________________  
discriminatory effect.   It appears that plaintiffs suggest that with 
discovery they may be able to make a case of intent  
under Title VI comparable to that which the Court accepted in Davis as 
meeting the intent requirement under Title IX.  
Without deciding whether a variation of the Davis standard applies here, 
we believe that plaintiffs have made adequate  
allegations to survive a motion to dismiss and justify discovery. We note 
that plaintiffs here recognized that "allegations  
of racial discrimination are very serious." Plaintiffs should not be 
penalized for their scrupulousness in declining to 
include allegations against elected officials concerning conduct that they 
suspect but of which they currently have  
no direct proof.  
 
 
At trial, a Title VI disparate impact plaintiff cannot meet the burden of 
establishing a prima facie case without 
proving "that the defendants' racially neutral practice detrimentally 
affects persons of a particular race to a greater 
extent than other races." Id. at 1421. It is not enough for the plaintiff 
"merely [to] prove circumstances raising an 
inference of discriminatory impact at issue; [the plaintiff] must prove 
the discriminatory impact at issue." Johnson 
 v. Uncle Ben's Inc., 657 F.2d 750, 753 (5th Cir. 1981).  
 
The burden a Title VI plaintiff must meet to survive a motion to dismiss, 
however, is much less onerous. To survive  
a motion to dismiss, all that the plaintiff must do is plead that a 
facially neutral practice's adverse effects fall  
disproportionately on a group protected by Title VI. The Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit explained in Ring v. 
First Interstate Mortgage, Inc., 984 F.2d 924 (8th Cir. 1993): "the prima 
facie case under [disparate impact] analysis is  
an evidentiary standard -- it defines the quantum of proof plaintiff must 
present to create a rebuttable presumption  
of discrimination . . . . Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an 
evidentiary standard is not a proper measure of  
whether a complaint fails to state a claim." Id. at 926. Furthermore, as 
the Supreme Court has stated, "[w]hen a federal  
court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint . . . [t]he issue is not 
whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether  
the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Scheuer 
v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled  
on other grounds, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); accord Lake 
v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 688 (3d Cir. 1997).  
 
The complaint in this case states, inter alia: The Commonwealth 
Defendants' funding system for education gives 
school districts with high proportions of white students on average more 
Commonwealth treasury revenues than 
school districts with high proportions of non-white students, where the 
levels of student poverty are the same.  
App. at 37-38.  
 
When Commonwealth treasury revenues per pupil are analyzed by the amount 
of poverty in school districts across 
the Commonwealth . . . school districts with higher proportions of non-
white students receive less Commonwealth 
treasury revenues than districts with higher proportions of white 
students.  
App. at 38-39.  
 
On average, for 1995-96, for two school districts with the same level of 
poverty . . . the school districts with higher 
non-white enrollment received $52.88 less per pupil for each increase of 
1% in non-white enrollment.  
App. at 39.  
 
The Commonwealth's funding policies and practices disadvantage . . . 
students in [underfunded] districts . . . . The 
foreseeable result [of the funding policies] has been serious impairment 
of the educational opportunities of the 
students in the School District, including the Student Plaintiffs. Lack of 
sufficient resources in the School District 
results, inter alia, in larger class sizes and higher pupil-to-teacher 
ratios than in surrounding school districts; reduced  
curricula; cuts in and elimination of programs and electives and advanced 
placement courses, shortages of textbooks  
and use of outdated textbooks; shortages of equipment, supplies and 
technology; spartan physical education and  
extracurricular programs; lack of librarians and library services; 
insufficient numbers of counselors and psychologists;  
and many inadequate and crumbling physical facilities.  
App. at 40-41.  
 
These allegations are sufficient to put the defendants on notice that the 
plaintiffs will attempt to prove (1) that less 
educational funding is provided by the Commonwealth to school districts 
attended by most non-white students in 
Pennsylvania than to school districts attended by most white students, (2) 
that the school districts attended by most 
non-white students in Pennsylvania receive less total educational funding 
than do the school districts attended by 
most white students,2 (3) that these disparities in funding are produced 
by the Commonwealth's funding formula, 
and (4) that the funding disparities injure non- white students by 
limiting their educational opportunities. Although  
the language of the complaint may not always be precise or its thrust 
clear, we nonetheless believe that plaintiffs' 
allegations provide more than sufficient notice to meet the pleading 
standard. We therefore hold that the plaintiffs 
should be given the opportunity to offer evidence in support of their 
claims. Whether they will ultimately be entitled  
to prevail is a very different question on which we express no opinion.  
 
The District Court's contrary conclusion that the plaintiffs' complaint 
does not meet the pleading standard rests on a  
mischaracterization of the complaint. The District Court described the 
complaint as alleging that "the uniformly 
applied state formula for allocating basic education funds among the 501 
school districts does not bring about the 
same results in Philadelphia as it might in another, more affluent 
district. . . ." Powell, slip op. at 29. This 
characterization suggests that the disparity the plaintiffs have pled is 
one based on economic circumstances rather 
than race. However, the complaint specifically alleges that the disparity 
in funding cannot be explained by reference  
to relative wealth or poverty because the disparities are present when 
districts of the same poverty level are  
compared. See, e.g., App. at 37-39.  
_________________________________________________________________  
2. In their reply brief, the plaintiffs state, "The Complaint alleges 
adverse racial impact in both the distribution of 
Commonwealth treasury revenues and the allocation of total public school 
funding dollars in Pennsylvania, for  
which the Commonwealth is statutorily and constitutionally responsible. 
See, e.g., J.A. 35-39, ¶¶ 47, 52, 56, 57."  
Appellants' Reply Br. at 24. Although a liberal reading of the paragraphs 
cited appears to support plaintiffs'  
statement, if there is any disagreement as to whether the complaint does 
so allege, it can be resolved by  
amendment.  
 
 
The District Court also stated that "the Plaintiffs want the School 
District to get more than the statutory formula 
provides under the theory that factors external to the state subsidy 
program make education more expensive or 
funding shortfalls greater in Philadelphia." Powell, slip op. at 32. This 
misstates the plaintiffs' request. 
Notwithstanding the District Court's characterization, the plaintiffs do 
not rely on any factors external to the state 
subsidy program in seeking more funding than is provided under the 
statutory formula. According to their  
allegations, they seek more funding on the ground that the formula 
provides minority school districts3 with less  
funding than it does similarly situated non-minority districts, regardless 
of the cost of education.  
 
Because these mischaracterizations affected the District Court's decision 
and because a review of the complaint 
establishes that the complaint, when not mischaracterized, meets the 
pleading standard, we must reverse.  
 
Defendants argue that the complaint fails to state a claim because it 
compares the effect of the funding formula on 
school districts rather than its effect on individuals. Unquestionably, 
under Title VI and 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2), the  
disparate impact complained of must fall on an individual rather than on a 
school district. Plaintiffs, cognizant of  
that requirement, have alleged that the Commonwealth's funding system 
results in proportionately less funding per  
child to school districts with high proportions of non-white students than 
to school districts with high proportions  
of white students. They argue that the effect of less funding per student 
is larger class sizes, higher pupil per  
teacher ratios, reduced curricula, fewer programs, and less textbooks, 
equipment, supplies, and technology per  
student than received by school districts with proportionately more white 
students. While it may 
_________________________________________________________________  
 
3. The complaint focuses on the Philadelphia School District which is 
alleged to have a 77% to 80% minority student  
body. Plaintiffs allege that there are eleven other school districts in 
Pennsylvania with student bodies composed of  
more than 50% minorities.  
 
 
ultimately be more difficult to prove the impact, and consequently the 
disparate impact, on the school children because  
the funding is directed to the school districts, that potential difficulty 
does not justify denying plaintiffs the  
opportunity to prove the effect alleged.  
 
Defendants also argue that plaintiffs' comparisons of school districts are 
invalid because there are some white 
students in the allegedly disadvantaged minority school districts and some 
non-white students in the allegedly 
advantaged white school districts. Defendants' position was made explicit 
at oral argument when their counsel 
stated that in order to show an adverse effect, "It's my position that 
[plaintiffs] have to show that 100 percent [of 
the minority students] are, in fact, adversely affected." Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 53. We know of no authority  
that imposes such a requirement. The regulation merely prohibits "the 
effect of subjecting individuals to 
discrimination because of their race." If plaintiffs succeed in their 
attempt to show disparate effect resulting from 
the challenged funding practices, the number of non-white school children 
affected might be relevant to the 
factfinder's determination whether the adverse effect is "because of their 
race." We have never held, however, that 
as a matter of law the practice complained of must affect a certain 
minimum percentage of the minority group to 
justify a finding that the discrimination is because of race.  
 
In addition, defendants complain that plaintiffs only compare subsets of 
school districts, selected by reference to 
such factors as poverty, proximity to the School District, or "high 
proportion" of minority school children (sometimes  
described as 75% or more minority enrollment). Specifically, defendants 
contend that plaintiffs never "compare the  
total revenues of all minority districts, however defined, with the total 
revenues of all majority districts [presumably  
per student]." Executive Defendants' Br. at 22. We need not determine here 
whether the particular comparisons  
plaintiffs make in their complaint are either necessary or sufficient to 
prove disparate impact. The relevance and  
validity of these comparisons goes to the merits of plaintiffs' case, not 
to the maintenance of their complaint, and  
should be determined only upon a developed record. Finally, defendants 
contend that the complaint is insufficient  
because it fails to identify a particular part of the funding formula as 
producing the disparate impact. This argument  
assumes without justification that it is a portion of the formula and not 
the formula as a whole that produces the alleged  
effects. Moreover, it would be a daunting hurdle were plaintiffs required 
at the pleading stage, before answers have  
been filed and before discovery, to identify what specific portion or 
portions of the Commonwealth's complex funding  
formula is responsible for the alleged inequality. We note that there are 
many components to the Commonwealth's  
formula, which the plaintiffs allege was changed each year between 1991-92 
and 1996-97. Indeed, even after requesting 
and receiving supplemental briefs from the parties concerning that 
formula, we remain unable to discern with precision 
 the basis on which the Commonwealth funds the school districts. It may be 
that some of the necessary information will  
be forthcoming from the defendants' files and employees during discovery.  
 
Under these circumstances, we conclude that the plaintiffs did not need to 
identify in the complaint a particular 
portion of the formula as objectionable in order to plead a disparate 
impact claim. To survive a motion to dismiss, 
plaintiffs need merely plead sufficient allegations to put the defendants 
on notice of what they intend to prove at 
trial. The defendants in this case are on notice that plaintiffs intend to 
prove that their funding formula produces 
disparate effects, and the defendants are in as good a position as anybody 
to know precisely what that funding 
formula entails.  
 
B.  
 
Defendants argue that we should uphold the District Court's decision on 
the alternate ground that Title VI 
regulations do not provide a private right of action. It is by now well 
established that implication of a private right of  
action for a statute requires analysis of the factors set forth in Cort v. 
Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The Cort factors 
ask:  
 
 
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the 
statute was enacted"-- that is, does the statute 
create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any 
indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit,  
either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent 
with the underlying purposes of the legislative  
scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause 
of action one traditionally relegated to  
state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it 
would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action  
based solely on federal law?  
 
Id. at 78 (citations omitted). A similar analysis which incorporates the 
Cort factors is appropriate in determining 
whether to infer a private right of action from an agency rule or 
regulation. See Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache 
Securities, Inc., 764 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1985).  
 
In Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 927, a decision that has since been 
vacated as moot, this court considered the 
issue before us here, "whether a private right of action exists under 
discriminatory effect regulations promulgated by 
federal administrative agencies pursuant to section 602 of Title VI." 
Although the plaintiffs there had contended that 
the Supreme Court's decisions in Guardians Association v. Civil Service 
Commission, 463 U.S. 582 (1983), and 
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985), establish the existence of a 
private right of action under the regulations, 
we rejected that contention. We noted that although five Justices 
implicitly endorsed the existence of a private right 
of action in those cases, the Supreme Court never directly addressed the 
issue. See Chester Residents, 132 F.2d at 
929-33.  
 
We also rejected the suggestion of the defendants that our discussion in 
Chowdhury v. Reading Hospital and 
Medical Center, 677 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1982), regarding the requirements 
for a claim of intentional discrimination 
under section 601 of Title VI necessarily means that there is no private 
right of action under section 602 of the Act. 
We thus found no direct authority confirming or denying a private right of 
action under the Title VI regulation. 
Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 931.  
 
We then proceeded to apply the Angelastro analysis to decide whether such 
a right of action should be inferred. In 
Angelastro, we applied a three-pronged test in"[d]eciding whether to imply 
a private right of action from an agency  
rule." First, a court must ascertain whether a private right of action 
exists under the statute under which the rule was  
promulgated. See id. "If under Cort v. Ash and its progeny, a court finds 
that Congress did not intend the 
statute to be enforced by private actions, then the inquiry is concluded." 
Id. Otherwise, two further inquiries must  
be made: "whether the agency rule is properly within the scope of the 
enabling statute" and "whether implying a  
private right of action will further the purposes of the enabling 
statute." Id.  
 
In Chester Residents, we quickly resolved the inquiry into the second and 
third prongs of Angelastro. We 
determined that the agency rule is properly within the scope of Title VI 
because in its unanimous opinion in 
Alexander the Supreme Court stated that " `actions having an unjustifiable 
disparate impact on minorities [can] be 
redressed through agency regulations designed to implement the purposes of 
Title VI.' " Chester Residents, 132 
F.3d at 933 (alteration in original) (quoting Alexander, 469 U.S. at 293).  
 
We also concluded that the third prong -- whether implying a private right 
of action under the disparate impact 
regulations will further the purposes of Title VI -- was also satisfied. 
Title VI's purposes are to"(1) combat 
discrimination by entities who receive federal funds; and (2) provide 
citizens with effective protection against 
discrimination." Id. at 936 (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 
U.S. 677, 704 (1979)). Therefore, we 
reasoned, "a private right of action will increase enforcement," and we 
concluded that such increased enforcement 
will further Title VI's purposes, compensating for the agency's lack of 
sufficient resources to adequately enforce the 
regulation itself. Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 936.  
 
 
The Angelastro prong to which we devoted the most attention in Chester 
Residents was the first inquiry, which asks  
whether the statute under which the regulation was promulgated (here Title 
VI) properly permits the implication of a  
private right of action. We analyzed this prong in Chester Residents in 
terms of the Cort factors and determined that  
the Title VI regulations create federal rights in favor of individual 
plaintiffs (the first Cort factor), and that "there is  
some indication in the legislative history . . . of an intent to create a 
private right of action" (the second Cort factor).  
See Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 933 n.10, 934. We further held that 
implying a remedy for the plaintiffs is consistent  
with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme (the third factor), 
reasoning:  
 
The procedural requirements in section 602 provide a fund recipient with a 
form of notice that the agency has begun  
an investigation which may culminate in the termination of its funding. We 
note that a private lawsuit also affords a  
fund recipient similar notice. If the purpose of the requirements is to 
provide bare notice, private lawsuits are consistent  
with the legislative scheme of Title VI. Furthermore, unlike the EPA, 
private plaintiffs do not have 
authority to terminate funding. As a result, the purpose that the 
requirements serve is not as significant in private 
lawsuits, where the potential remedy does not include the result (i.e., 
termination of funding) at which Congress 
directed the requirements. Stated differently, the requirements were 
designed to cushion the blow of a result that 
private plaintiffs cannot effectuate.  
 
Id. at 935-36 (footnote omitted). Finally, the last Cort factor -- whether 
the cause of action is one traditionally 
relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of States -- was 
deemed "irrelevant because Title VI is 
federal law." Id. at 933 n.10.  
 
We need not take this somewhat circuitous route to analyze the first 
Angelastro factor in the inquiry we make here. 
In Angelastro, we explained that the initial inquiry focuses on whether 
the statute implemented by the regulation 
contains an implied private right of action: "Where the enabling statute 
authorizes an implied right of action, courts  
should permit private suits under agency rules within the scope of the 
enabling statute if doing so is not at variance  
with the purpose of the statute. . .. [I]f Congress intended to permit 
private actions for violations of the statute, `it  
would be anomalous to preclude private parties from suing under the rules 
that impart meaning to the statute.' " 764  
F.2d at 947. As noted above, the regulation at issue here, although 
promulgated by the Department of Education  
under section 602 of Title VI, implements section 601 of Title VI. See 42 
U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (authorizing regulation "to  
effectuate the provisions of section 2000d of . . . title [42]"). The 
Supreme Court precedent and our cases firmly  
establish that section 601 of Title VI gives rise to an implied right of 
action, at least for purposes of securing injunctive  
relief. See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 593-95 (Opinion of White, J.); Cannon, 
441 U.S. at 694-703, 710-16; Cheyney State  
College Faculty v. Hufstedler, 703 F.2d 732, 737 (3d Cir. 1983); NAACP v. 
Medical Ctr., Inc., 599 F.2d 1247, 1248, 1250  
n.10 (3d Cir. 1979). It therefore follows that the first prong of 
Angelastro is satisfied. We are persuaded by the analyses  
in Chester Residents that the second and third prong of Angelastro are 
also met.  
 
Our conclusion is in keeping with the decisions of the other courts of 
appeals that have addressed this issue. The 
Eleventh Circuit has explicitly "recognized an implied private right of 
action to enforce the regulations promulgated  
under section 602 of Title VI," thereby permitting private plaintiffs to 
"obtain injunctive or declaratory relief by  
showing, inter alia, that the challenged action has `a disparate impact on 
groups protected by the statute, even if those  
actions are not intentionally discriminatory.' " Burton v. City of Belle 
Glade, No. 97-5091, 1999 WL 425895 (11th Cir.  
June 25, 1999) (quoting Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 
1394, 1406 (11th Cir. 1993)); see also Georgia  
State Conference, 775 F.2d at 1417. At least four other federal courts of 
appeal have reached the merits of disparate  
impact claims brought by individual plaintiffs under the Title VI 
regulations, although without explicitly determining  
whether a private right of action exists thereunder. See Villanueva v. 
Carere, 85 F.3d 481, 486-87 (10th Cir. 1996)  
(affirming refusal to grant preliminary injunction on grounds that 
disparate impact had not been adequately shown);  
New York Urban League, Inc. v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(same); City of Chicago v. Lindley, 66 F.3d 819,  
827-30 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming grant of summary judgment to defendant 
on ground that disparate impact had not  
been adequately shown); Larry P. by Lucille P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969 (9th 
Cir. 1984) (affirming judgment for plaintiff on  
disparate impact claim following trial).  
 
Defendants nevertheless argue that interpreting the Title VI regulation to 
provide a private right of action would 
contravene the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), that 
administrative regulations may not create federal law. There the Court 
stated, "The rulemaking power granted to an  
administrative agency charged with the administration of a federal statute 
is not the power to make law. Rather, it is  
the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress 
as expressed by the statute." See id. at 
213-14 (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendants argue that because 
the Title VI regulation extends the 
conduct prohibited by Title VI to encompass disparate impact 
discrimination, whereas Title VI prohibits only 
intentional discrimination, a holding that private suits may be brought 
under the regulation would effectively permit  
administrative agencies to create substantive law.  
 
Defendants' argument conflicts with the Supreme Court's own 
pronouncements. As previously noted, in Guardians 
five of the nine justices agreed that the administrative regulations 
incorporating a disparate impact standard are 
valid, see 463 U.S. at 584 n.2, 607 n.27, and thereafter the Court in 
Alexander characterized Guardians as so 
holding. See Alexander, 469 U.S. at 293 ("[Guardians held that actions 
having an unjustifiable disparate impact on 
minorities could be redressed through agency regulations designed to 
implement the purposes of Title VI"). 
Obviously, the Supreme Court did not believe that administrative 
regulations that prohibit disparate impact were  
an impermissible creation of substantive law, even though in its own 
earlier opinion in Guardians the Supreme Court  
had held that Title VI itself did not extend that far. See also United 
States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 672-73 (1997)  
(sustaining SEC regulation that prohibits more activities than statute on 
ground that "[a] prophylactic measure,  
because its mission is to prevent, typically encompasses more than the 
core activity prohibited").  
 
Moreover, numerous other appellate decisions have implied private rights 
of actions under regulations under similar  
circumstances. See, e.g., Lowrey v. Texas A&M University System, 117 F.3d 
242 (5th Cir. 1997) (Department of  
Education regulations promulgated under Title IX of the Education 
Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et  
seq.); Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,749 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 
1984) (Securities and Exchange Commission Rule  
10b-16, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16). In each of these cases, the analysis as to 
whether there was a private right of action to  
enforce the regulation at issue would not have been necessary if the 
regulation did not go further than that statute;  
the private right of action under the particular statute alone would have 
sufficed.  
 
We therefore reject defendants' arguments that Count I of this complaint 
does not state a claim under the 
Department of Education regulation. We do not decide whether every 
allegation of Count I of the complaint states a  
viable claim under the Title VI regulation. Because the District Court 
misread the thrust of the complaint, it never  
parsed the allegations to ascertain how and whether they differ. We do not 
suggest that the complaint be dissected  
upon remand. We merely decide that there is at least one viable claim and 
that plaintiffs should be permitted to  
proceed to discovery after answers have been filed.  
 
C.  
 
Plaintiffs' second count invokes one of the Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, to redress the defendants' alleged 
violation of the regulation. Section 1983 states:  
 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or 
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen 
of the United States or other person within 
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in a[ ] . . . proper proceeding 
for redress.  
 
The District Court properly interpreted this statute to mean that "[a] § 
1983 action has two essential elements: (1) 
that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under 
color of state law; and (2) that this conduct 
deprived a [citizen or other] person of rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States." Powell, slip op. at 12 (emphasis added).  
 
The District Court pretermitted any analysis of whether the complaint 
adequately alleges that the defendants 
deprived any person of rights secured by the laws of the United States 
within the scope of § 1983 because it held 
that the four defendants cannot be sued under that statute. First it held 
that "[a]s officials of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania who have been sued for actions taken while in their official 
capacities, Ridge, Hickok and Hafer are 
not `persons' under § 1983." Id. at 14. Then it held that Gallagher, who 
was sued solely for actions taken in his 
official capacity as the chairperson of the Commonwealth's Board of 
Education, is not a "person" who may be sued 
under § 1983 because the Board's funding comes directly from the 
Commonwealth and it is therefore "an arm of 
the state" immune from suit. Id. The District Court's conclusions 
contravene the applicable Supreme Court 
precedent. When state officials are sued in their official capacities for 
damages, that suit is treated as one against 
the state and the official is not considered to be a "person." See Will v. 
Michigan Dept. of State Police, 492 U.S. 58,  
71 & n.10 (1989). Hence, § 1983 cannot be invoked. On the other hand, when 
the § 1983 suit seeks damages 
against the state officials in their individual or personal capacities, it 
may be maintained (subject to any applicable 
immunity doctrine) even though they acted in their official capacities in 
the matter at issue. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 
U.S. 21, 27 (1991) ("A government official in the role of personal-
capacity defendant . . . fits comfortably within the  
statutory term `person' ").  
 
A suit for damages must be contrasted with a suit for equitable relief. 
The Supreme Court has held that a state 
official sued for injunctive relief is a "person" under § 1983 because an 
action for prospective relief is not treated as 
a suit against the state. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10 ("[A] state 
official in his or her official capacity, when sued for  
injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because `official-
capacity actions for prospective relief are not 
treated as actions against the State.' " (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 
U.S. 19, 167 n.14 (1985)); see also 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 666-74 (1974) (discussing Ex parte Young, 
209 U.S. 123 (1908)).  
 
The complaint in this case seeks only the equitable remedies of an 
injunction and declaratory relief. The conclusion 
that Ridge, Hickok, Hafer, and Gallagher are persons within the meaning of 
§ 1983 is thus inescapable.  
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, defendants have chosen not to defend the 
District Court's reasoning, arguing instead that 
the District Court's decision may be upheld on another ground. 
Notwithstanding our general reluctance to venture 
into areas the District Court did not consider, we consider this issue now 
as a matter of judicial expediency because 
the case will be remanded and it will undoubtedly arise again.  
 
Defendants first argue that Title VI's "comprehensive enforcement scheme" 
precludes a § 1983 claim. Once a 
plaintiff has identified a federal right that has allegedly been violated, 
there arises a "rebuttable presumption that the  
right is enforceable under § 1983." Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 
341 (1997). The presumption is rebutted "if  
Congress `specifically foreclosed a remedy under § 1983' . . . [either] 
expressly, by forbidding recourse to § 1983 in  
the statute itself, or impliedly, by creating a comprehensive enforcement 
scheme that is incompatible with individual  
enforcement under § 1983." Id. (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 
1005 n.9 (1984)).  
 
Neither Title VI nor the regulation promulgated thereunder purports to 
restrict the availability of relief under § 1983.  
Defendants thus "must make the difficult showing that allowing a § 1983 
action to go forward in these 
circumstances `would be inconsistent with Congress' carefully tailored 
scheme.' " Id. at 346 (quoting Golden State 
Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 107 (1989)).  
 
Only twice has the Supreme Court found a remedial scheme sufficiently 
comprehensive to supplant§ 1983. See 
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 
(1981); Smith v. Robinson , 468 
U.S. 992 (1984). In both instances, the Supreme Court emphasized that the 
statutes that were held to be displaced 
themselves specifically provided aggrieved individuals with extensive 
statutory remedies. However, the Supreme 
Court has cautioned that "a plaintiff's ability to invoke § 1983 cannot be 
defeated simply by `[t]he availability of 
administrative mechanisms to protect plaintiff 's interests.' " Blessing, 
520 U.S. at 347 (quoting Golden State, 493 
U.S. at 347). On at least three occasions the Court found that an agency's 
authority to cut off federal funding was 
insufficient to justify the denial of a § 1983 remedy. See Wright v. City 
of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing 
Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 428 (1987); Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass'n, 496 
U.S. 498, 521-22 (1990); Blessing, 520 U.S.  
at 347-48.  
 
Cognizant of this guidance, we see no reason to hold that resort to § 1983 
has been foreclosed here. Neither Title 
VI nor the Department of Education regulation establishes "an elaborate 
procedural mechanism to protect the rights  
of [individual plaintiffs]," as did the statute at issue in Smith, where 
the Court stated, "The [Act's] procedures . . . 
ensure that hearings [are] conducted by the state[and that these hearings 
are] fair and adequate," 468 U.S. at 1010-11  
(interpreting the Education of the Handicapped Act, 84 Stat. 175, as 
amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.).  Nor is it  
possible to describe the administrative remedies Title VI and the 
regulations establish as "unusually elaborate," as  
the Court described the enforcement provisions of the pollution control 
statutes at issue in Sea Clammers. See 453  
U.S. at 13. Indeed, the statutory scheme under Title VI does not 
specifically provide individual plaintiffs with any  
administrative remedy. See Chowdhury, 677 F.2d at 319 (noting that under 
the administrative enforcement mechanism  
Congress provided in section 602 of Title VI, "an aggrieved individual may 
file a complaint with the funding agency  
but has no role in the investigation or adjudication, if any, of the 
complaint" (footnotes omitted)).  
 
Defendants nonetheless contend that we are constrained to hold that 
plaintiffs' claim under § 1983 may not coexist 
with Title VI because of our decisions in two Title IX cases: Williams v. 
School District, 998 F.2d 168 (3d Cir. 
1993), and Pfeiffer v. Marion Center Area School District, 917 F.2d 779 
(3d Cir. 1990). In Williams, a male student  
brought suit alleging that the defendants violated Title IX by excluding 
him from the girls' field hockey team. Williams'  
complaint also stated a claim under § 1983 and the Equal Protection 
Clause. On appeal, we reversed the grant of  
summary judgment to Williams on the Title IX claim, holding that disputed 
issues of material fact remained. We also  
vacated the district court's judgment for plaintiff on his constitutional 
claims brought under § 1983. We held that the  
district court should have refrained from deciding the plaintiff 's § 1983 
action in keeping with"the Supreme Court's  
admonition that courts should exercise restraint before reaching federal 
constitutional claims." Williams, 998 F.2d at 176.  
 
In Williams, we relied on our earlier opinion in Pfeiffer, where we upheld 
the district court's decision not to reach 
plaintiff 's constitutional claims of gender discrimination brought under 
§ 1983 once it had decided that Pfeiffer's 
constitutional claims were "subsumed" within her Title IX claim.  
 
Defendants contend that these cases stand for the broad proposition that 
all § 1983 claims are precluded by Title IX and  
argue that Title VI must be similarly interpreted. Those decisions cannot 
be interpreted that broadly. They 
concerned the interaction between a plaintiff 's constitutional claims and 
statutory claims, and the holdings were 
predicated on the principle that courts should refrain from deciding 
constitutional issues unnecessarily. For example, in  
Williams we stated that the proper course in Pfeiffer was for the district 
court to "refuse[ ] to hear plaintiff 's section 1983  
claim." Williams, 998 F.2d at 176 (emphasis added). Similarly, we 
described ourselves as "not reach[ing] the constitutional  
issues" Williams sought to raise. Id. (emphasis added). We vacated the 
district court's §1983 ruling, rather than reversing  
it or remanding for further proceedings. Those holdings and pronouncements 
are consistent with the prudential imperative  
not to resolve a constitutional issue unnecessarily. They do not suggest, 
as defendants state, that there can never be a §  
1983 claim for violation of Title IX.  
 
Most important here is that plaintiffs do not invoke § 1983 to redress a 
constitutional claim but instead a claim under federal  
law. Thus, the principle that courts should avoid deciding constitutional 
claims whenever possible is inapplicable. We  
therefore reject defendants' contention that our decision here is 
controlled by these past precedents. Instead, we hold that  
a § 1983 suit is not incompatible with Title VI and the Title VI 
regulation. At oral argument, plaintiffs' counsel recognized that  
at some point in the litigation it may develop that it is not necessary to 
maintain both the claim evolving from Title VI and the  
§ 1983 claim, and the approach taken in Pfeiffer and Williams may be 
appropriate. We agree that no more is required now.  
 
D.  
 
Finally, the legislative intervenor defendants question the plaintiffs' 
standing to maintain each count of their complaint on  
the ground that plaintiffs' injury is not likely to be redressed by court 
action. In order to have standing under the Constitution,  
a plaintiff must show (1) an actual injury that is (2) causally connected 
to the conduct complained of and (3) likely to be  
"redressed by a favorable decision." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 560- 61 (1992) (internal quotation marks  
omitted). The injury must consist of "an invasion of a judicially 
cognizable interest which is (a) concrete and particularized  
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Id. at 560 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  
 
The legislative defendants contend that any injury the plaintiffs may have 
suffered is not redressable because 
"approximately half of the funds received by the School District are from 
local sources not controlled by the 
Executive Branch Defendants," who presumably are free to decrease their 
contribution for public education. 
Legislative Defendants' Br. at 35. The legislative defendants therefore 
conclude that, under those circumstances, 
the court's order would not redress the plaintiffs' injury, and hence they 
have no standing.  
 
We reject the defendants' contention because their argument implicitly 
mischaracterizes plaintiffs' injury. The 
legislative defendants err in assuming that the injury in this case 
consists of a lack of adequate funding. Here, the 
plaintiffs complain that non-white school children in Pennsylvania receive 
less favorable treatment than their white  
counterparts because the state funds the school districts most of them 
attend at a lower level than it does the school districts  
most white school children attend. A court order directing the state to 
equalize funding between these school districts  
would redress this comparative injury, even if other sources of the school 
district's income were simultaneously reduced. We  
therefore conclude that the school children's injury is redressable by 
court order.4  
 
The concept of standing also encompasses prudential limits on federal-
court jurisdiction. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 
U.S. 490, 498 (1975). Courts require plaintiffs to satisfy certain 
prudential concerns in an effort "to avoid deciding 
questions of broad social import where no individual rights would be 
vindicated and to limit access to the federal 
courts to those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim." 
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S.  
91, 99-100 (1979). Thus, they require (1) that the injury alleged not be a 
"generalized grievance" that is "shared in  
substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens," (2) that 
the plaintiff assert his/her own legal rights  
rather than those of other parties, and (3) that "the plaintiff 's 
complaint . . . fall within the zone of interests to be  
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in 
question." Valley Forge Christian College v.  
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 
474-75 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 
Not all plaintiffs must meet the prudential standing requirements imposed 
by courts. Congress may legislatively 
direct that standing under a particular act is to be limited only by 
Article III. See Gladstone, Realtors, 441 U.S. at 
100; Fair Housing Council v. Montgomery Newspapers, 141 F.3d 71, 75 (3d 
Cir. 1998).  
_________________________________________________________________  
4. Moreover, plaintiffs take the position that the Commonwealth is 
responsible for all of the School District's 
funding. We need not decide that issue in order to hold that plaintiffs 
have adequately pled standing. 
 
 
In such case plaintiffs may" `seek relief on the basis of the legal rights 
and interests of others, and . . . may 
invoke the general public interest' " in support of their claim. Fair 
Housing Council, 141 F.3d at 75 (quoting  
Warth, 422 U.S. at 500).  
 
The defendants contend that the City of Philadelphia, the School District 
of Philadelphia, the Board of Education  
of the School District of Philadelphia, and the individual officers 
(collectively, the "City and School District  
plaintiffs") lack prudential standing because they are not asserting their 
own legal rights, but rather those of other  
parties. The legislative defendants argue that the City and School 
District plaintiffs are not "person[s]" within the  
meaning of Title VI and that, therefore these plaintiffs have no rights of 
their own under that statute. The District  
Court accepted this contention and dismissed the complaint as to the City 
and School District plaintiffs. The  
plaintiffs challenge that dismissal on appeal.  
 
A determination of the standing of the City and School District plaintiffs 
at this time would involve us in a complex  
issue that may have no practical significance. We note in this regard that 
the defendants do not challenge the  
prudential standing of the school children, and those plaintiffs plainly 
meet the constitutional standing requirements.  
Thus, there are individual plaintiffs in this case who will carry the suit 
forward in any event.  
 
Nor can there be serious question about the standing of the organization 
plaintiffs, which the executive defendants 
have not challenged. The standing of the plaintiff organizations to bring 
this suit is consistent with the long line of 
cases in which organizations have sued to enforce civil rights, civil 
liberties, environmental interests, etc. See 
Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 308 
(1985); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman , 455 
U.S. 363, 369 (1982); Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 352, 353 & n.8 
(1979); Fair Employment Council of 
Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC Marketing Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1276 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994); Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 
F.2d at 1322.  
 
Therefore, this situation is analogous to that presented in Village of 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). There, a real estate development 
corporation challenged the local 
authority's refusal to rezone a particular parcel of land to allow the 
construction of racially integrated housing. The 
Supreme Court found that the corporation met the constitutional standing 
requirements but was less certain that the  
corporation met prudential standing requirements given that the 
corporation had not itself been discriminated against  
on the basis of race. The Court held that it need not decide the 
prudential standing question because another of the  
plaintiffs, an individual, had suffered the discrimination directly. See 
id. at 264 & n.9.  
 
We likewise conclude that we need not decide whether the City and School 
District plaintiffs meet prudential 
standing requirements because the individual school children, who have 
allegedly suffered discrimination directly, 
and the plaintiff organizations may properly bring this controversy before 
the federal courts.  
 
III.  
 
As we have stated earlier, we take no position on the merits of the 
allegations of the complaint. It is indeed a  
serious matter for plaintiffs to charge that the practices of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in funding public  
schools have a racially disparate effect. But if the charge is serious, so 
are the inevitable effects if the charge turns  
out to have merit. We need no long list of citations to note the 
widespread recognition of the importance of a good  
public school education for all of our young people -- rich and poor, 
black and white. Horace Mann, the great educator,  
wrote "Education, . . . beyond all other devices of human origin, is the 
great equalizer of the conditions of men, -- the  
balance-wheel of the social machinery."  
 
We will reverse the order of the District Court dismissing the complaint, 
and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  
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